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THE INCOMPLETE PROCESS OF
FIXING ALASKA’S DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE PROTECTIVE ORDER
STATUTE
Samuel R. Buchman*
ABSTRACT
The Alaska legislature has codified, in section 18.66.100 of the Alaska Statutes,
a process through which petitioners can seek a domestic violence protective
order. Such an order offers petitioners a range of protections against a
household member who has committed a crime of domestic violence. Most of
the protections afforded under these orders last one year, and the means by
which a petitioner could renew a domestic violence protective order has, until
recently, remained unclear. In Whalen v. Whalen, decided in August 2018
by a three to two margin, the Alaska Supreme Court clarified that renewal
process. The court held that a petitioner must suffer a new crime of domestic
violence before a new domestic violence protective order can be issued. Such a
ruling may seem quite harsh, and in fact, shortly thereafter, the legislature
amended section 18.66.100 to provide for an extension mechanism and to
explicitly reject the notion that a new order must be predicated on a new crime
of domestic violence. This Note inspects why the ruling, rather than a harsh
judicial construct, was instead a product of the separation of powers and a
respect for the limits of the court vis-à-vis the legislature. Further, this Note
engages with the legislative history to illustrate the development of the statute.
Lastly, this Note collects corresponding statutes from other states and
compares them to the current iteration of section 18.66.100. Upon review of
similar statutes, it is clear that the Whalen amendment merely addressed an
issue that should have never existed in the first place, and there is still much
that the legislature can do to build on the Whalen amendment in order to
reduce Alaska’s high rates of domestic violence.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In September 2014, Sarah Whalen obtained a domestic violence
protective order against her husband, Sean.1 Sean allegedly continued to
harass and intimidate Sarah and her family, and in September 2015, Sarah
requested a modification of the 2014 order, hoping to extend it.2 Since the
vast majority of the order’s provisions lasted only one year—the statutory
maximum—she felt an extension of the original order was necessary to
protect herself and her children.3 The superior court, however, denied her
request to modify the original order, instructing Sarah to petition for a
new order.4 In November 2015, five months after her divorce was
finalized, Sarah petitioned for a new protective order against her former
husband.5
The superior court held a hearing in December 2015.6 Sean and Sarah
both testified, but the court limited their testimony.7 Having issued its
original protective order based on Sean’s behavior up until September
2014, the court asserted that it could not grant a new protective order for
those same incidents.8 Under its interpretation of Alaska’s protective
order statute, section 18.66.100 of the Alaska Statutes, a new order could
only derive from a new incident of domestic violence.9 The court limited
Sarah’s testimony to Sean’s actions after September 2014.10 Since then,
nothing he had done qualified as a new incident of domestic violence, and
therefore the superior court denied Sarah’s petition.11 Sarah lost on
appeal, and the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed.12 Though swayed by the
policy arguments in Sarah’s favor, the court refrained from interpreting
the statute differently, noting that Sarah’s remedy was to be found in the
legislature, not the courts.13
Whalen v. Whalen highlights what was a critical flaw in section
18.66.100 of the Alaska Statutes, the law governing protective orders.
However, there is far more to the Whalen story than a court ruling and a
legislative fix. Alaska suffers from high rates of domestic violence; a
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Whalen v. Whalen, 425 P.3d 150, 152 (Alaska 2018).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 157.
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recent survey of Alaska women found that forty percent experienced
intimate partner violence and thirty-three percent experienced sexual
violence, resulting in one out of two women suffering one or the other, or
both.14 In 2017, among all states, Alaska had the highest rate at which
women were murdered by men,15 a ranking which remained unchanged
for the fourth straight year.16 The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention released data from 2010 to 2012, showing that 43.3% of Alaska
women were victims of any contact sexual violence, physical violence,
and/or stalking by an intimate partner, ranking the state second-worst
among all states and six percentage points higher than the national
average.17 Alaska Native women also experience domestic violence at far
higher rates than Alaska women of other ethnicities.18
The outcome in Whalen coupled with the aforementioned statistics
highlighted the necessity of a legislative response to the statute’s lack of
an extension provision. As a result, in 2019, the legislature amended
section 18.66.100 to include an extension mechanism, and further, to
explicitly reject the harsh outcome of Whalen.19
The court in Whalen demonstrated considerable restraint, and its
restraint was matched with a swift legislative response. These are both
good principles on which to build. Yet Alaska’s struggle with domestic
violence remains a pervasive issue, and the legislature has otherwise
remained relatively stagnant. Reviewing the development of the domestic
violence protective order statutory scheme can inform how the legislature
may take more significant steps forward without the need for another
Whalen to galvanize it into action.
This Note addresses the Whalen decision—assessing the court’s
14. ANDRÉ ROSAY & LAUREE MORTON, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AND
SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE STATE OF ALASKA: KEY RESULTS FROM THE 2015 ALASKA
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY (2016), https://scholarworks.alaska.edu/handle/11122/
8103.
15. VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., WHEN MEN MURDER WOMEN: AN ANALYSIS OF 2017
HOMICIDE DATA 4 (2019), https://vpc.org/studies/wmmw2019.pdf.
16. Beth Verge, Report: For Fourth Year In a Row, Alaska Has Highest Rate of Men
Killing Women, KTUU (Last updated Sept. 19, 2019 5:07 AM), https://
www.ktuu.com/content/news/Report-For-fourth-year-in-a-row-Alaska-hashighest-rate-of-men-killing-women-560736821.html.
17. SHARON SMITH ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND
SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY (NISVS): 2010-2012 STATE REPORT 128 (2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/NISVS-StateReportBook.pdf.
18. NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST
AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE WOMEN (2016), https://
www.speakcdn.com/assets/2497/american_indian_and_alaskan_native_wome
n__dv.pdf.
19. An Act Relating to Protective Orders, §§ 4, 5, 2019 Alaska Sess. Laws ch.
7, 2–3.
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deference, though not indifference, in the face of myriad policy
arguments. Many lessons can be gleaned from this strict adherence to the
separation of powers, especially considering the emotional nature of the
issues raised. Perhaps most importantly, the decision highlights the
important role that the legislature must play in this issue, and how the
legislature should demonstrate leadership moving forward.
Second, this Note analyzes the growth of section 18.66.100 and how
its stages of development may have been impacted, perhaps even limited,
by policy concerns unique to the realities of domestic violence. Next, this
Note reviews approaches in other states in order to benchmark Alaska’s
domestic violence protective order scheme. Finally, this Note addresses
how the newest iteration of section 18.66.100 still falls short, and how the
legislature can finally assume a leadership role by more effectively
addressing the pervasive issue of domestic violence in Alaska.

II. ALASKA’S PRE-WHALEN PROTECTIVE ORDER STATUTORY
SCHEME
Section 18.66.100 of the Alaska Statutes governs domestic violence
protective orders.20 The present statute is identical to the pre-Whalen
statute, aside from the added provisions aimed at resolving the issues
raised in Whalen.21 To be eligible for a protective order, the petitioner must
show, by a preponderance of evidence, that the respondent committed a
crime involving domestic violence.22 As defined in the statute, domestic
violence is violence “by a household member against another household
member.”23 The legislature lists these relationships as those between
spouses, people living together, people who are dating, and people who
have a sexual relationship,24 as well as a number of familial relationships,
including the children of a person in an aforementioned relationship.25
The legislature emphasized that each of these relationships need not be
current—they merely must be shown to have existed at one point.26
Section 18.66.990 of the Alaska Statutes enumerates a number of
criminal offenses which satisfy the act element, including homicide,
assault, reckless endangerment, kidnapping, sexual offenses, robbery,
extortion, coercion, burglary, criminal trespass, arson, criminal mischief,
20. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100 (2019).
21. See infra Part VI.
22. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(a).
23. Id. § 18.66.990(3) (2018).
24. See Beth Trimmer, Comment, A Sexual Relationship, Did We Have One? A
Review of the Definition of “Sexual Relationship” Within the Context of Alaska’s
Domestic Violence Laws, 24 ALASKA L. REV. 237, 255–56 (2007).
25. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(5) (2018).
26. Id.
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terrorist threatening, harassment, and cruelty to a pet.27
Commission of one of the crimes involving domestic violence set
forth in section 18.66.990, or a violation of a protective order itself, satisfies
the act requirement for the issuance of a protective order.28 A person
violates a protective order when he “knowingly commits or attempts to
commit an act with reckless disregard that the act violates . . . a provision
of the protective order.”29 The Alaska Supreme Court has clarified that
the statute does not permit ignorance of the law as a defense.30 To prove
a violation, the State must show that the person had notice of the
protective order and either “recklessly disregarded a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that his conduct was prohibited by the order,” or
knowingly committed or attempted to commit an act prohibited by the
order.31 Lastly, the statute does not require a criminal conviction; rather,
the petitioner must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
respondent committed a criminal act.32
Section 18.66.100 contains fifteen specific restrictions and mandates,
any of which the court can include in a protective order, as well as a catchall sixteenth provision, which gives the court discretion to “order other
relief the court determines necessary to protect the petitioner or any
household member.”33 Enumerated options for relief include prohibitions
against contacting the petitioner or other household members,34 entering
vehicles owned by the petitioner,35 and going to places frequented by the
petitioner or other household members.36 These prohibitions can also bar
the respondent from using controlled substances.37 Furthermore, the
order can remove and exclude the respondent from the petitioner’s

27. Id. § 18.66.990(3)(A)–(I).
28. Id. § 18.66.990(3)(G).
29. Id. § 11.56.740 (2018).
30. See State v. Strane, 61 P.3d 1284, 1292 (Alaska 2003) (“We thus hold that
AS 11.56.740(a) did not require the state to prove Strane’s actual knowledge of
illegality; instead, the statute’s culpable mental state requirement as to the
surrounding circumstances of the offense could be met by showing that Strane
knew of the restraining order’s existence and contents and that, so knowing, he
recklessly disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct was
prohibited by the order.”).
31. Id.
32. See State v. Bingaman, 991 P.2d 227, 230 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999) (“[T]he
legislature appears to consistently use the phrase ‘crimes involving domestic
violence,’ defined in AS 18.66.990(3), in a context which indicates that the
legislature is referring to a criminal act, not a criminal conviction.”).
33. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(c)(16) (2019).
34. Id. § 18.66.100(c)(2).
35. Id. § 18.66.100(c)(5).
36. Id. § 18.66.100(c)(4).
37. Id. § 18.66.100(c)(11).
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residence, regardless of the residence’s ownership.38 Lastly, only when
the court finds that the respondent possessed a firearm during the crime
can it direct the respondent to surrender all firearms for the duration of
the order.39
The court can take steps to remove children from dangerous
situations, as the statute permits the court to award temporary custody to
the petitioner.40 The statute also enables the court to order the respondent
to partake in alcohol-abuse treatment and participate in a rehabilitative
program for the perpetrators of domestic violence, serving as powerful
tools to begin correcting the root causes of these crimes.41
The statute’s financial provisions enable the court to order the
respondent to pay for the petitioner’s shelter, medical expenses,
counseling, property damage, and other costs incurred as a result of the
domestic violence.42
The aforementioned provisions laid out in section 18.66.100(c) are all
in effect for one year—or less if dissolved by the court—aside from
provisions of a protective order issued under subsection 18.66.100(c)(1),
which are “effective until further order of the court.”43 This indefinite
provision “prohibit[s] the respondent from threatening to commit or
committing domestic violence, stalking, or harassment.”44
Whereas protective orders are sought as a civil remedy, the violation
of a protective order is a Class A Misdemeanor,45 punishable by a $25,000
fine46 and a maximum of one year imprisonment.47 Moreover, violating a
protective order triggers section 18.65.530 of the Alaska Statutes, under
which the responding officer, upon a finding of probable cause, is
required to arrest the offender.48

III. WHALEN V. WHALEN
The protective order statutory scheme remained largely untouched
until it found the spotlight of the Alaska Supreme Court’s scrutiny. The
legislature’s opportunity to adjust the existing protective order statute

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. § 18.66.100(c)(3).
Id. § 18.66.100(c)(6)–(7).
Id. § 18.66.100(c)(9).
Id. § 18.66.100(c)(15).
Id. § 18.66.100(c)(13)–(14).
Id. § 18.66.100(b).
Id. § 18.66.100(c)(1).
Id. § 11.56.740 (2018).
Id. § 12.55.035(b)(5) (2018).
Id. § 12.55.135(a) (2018).
Id. § 18.65.530(a)(2) (2018).
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was highlighted in Whalen v. Whalen, decided in August of 2018.49 To
understand the options still available to the legislature, as well as the
reforms ultimately pursued in 2019, it is first important to illustrate in
what sense the court’s hands were tied in Whalen. As an initial matter, the
court disagreed with Sarah, the appellant, and held that section 18.66.100
of the Alaska Statutes did not permit a court to issue a protective order
where there was no new incident of domestic violence.50 The court based
its ruling on two grounds.
First, the court applied the theory of res judicata.51 When a claim has
been fully litigated and the court makes a final and valid judgment on the
claim’s merits, res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars the parties from
litigating the claim again.52 Thus, the court framed the issue as whether
or not “Sarah [was] attempting to receive a second judgment on a claim
that she has previously asserted.”53 Reasoning that the September 2014
protective order satisfied the elements of claim preclusion—a judgment
between the same parties that is valid, final, and on the merits—the court
determined that Sarah’s claim was extinguished.54
The court found Sarah’s two arguments opposing the applicability
of res judicata unpersuasive. Her first argument, that domestic violence
is an abatable condition and thus similar to a temporary nuisance, carried
little weight.55 A temporary nuisance claim permits a new cause of action
each time there is an invasion.56 However, a new invasion had not
occurred, and if it had, section 18.66.100 would have clearly applied.57 Her
second argument relied on McComas v. Kirn58—another case in which res
judicata was raised in relation to a protective order.59 However, in
McComas, the court found that the circumstances had materially changed,
and so the claim was not truly being relitigated.60 This exception did not
apply to Sarah’s case because her circumstances had not materially

49. 425 P.3d 150 (Alaska 2018).
50. Id. at 155.
51. Id. at 154.
52. See id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18(1) (AM. LAW
INST. 1982)) (“‘When a valid and final personal judgment is rendered in favor of
the plaintiff[,] . . . [t]he plaintiff cannot thereafter maintain an action on the
original claim or any part thereof, although [s]he may be able to maintain an
action upon the judgment.’”).
53. Id. at 154.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 105 P.3d 1130 (Alaska 2005).
59. Whalen, 425 P.3d at 154.
60. Id. at 154–55.
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changed.61
Second, the court based its holding on the statute’s language and
history. The court noted that the legislature undoubtedly contemplated a
renewal process; the legislature had set durational limitations for many
of the statute’s provisions but it had also allowed subsection (c)(1),
prohibiting acts or threats of domestic violence, to persist indefinitely at
the discretion of the judge.62 The court reasoned that these durational
specifications demonstrated the legislature’s intent to limit these orders
to the one-year timeframe.63 Furthermore, given that the original sixmonth time limit was doubled in 2004, the court posited that the
legislature could have provided for a renewal process, but that it had
eschewed such a process in favor of a longer duration.64 Most
importantly, the court noted that the legislature completely eliminated
the extension provision when it passed the 1996 Domestic Violence
Prevention and Victim Protection Act.65 Therefore, the absence of such a
provision in section 18.66.100, coupled with the legislature’s ample
opportunity and apparent decision not to institute a renewal process, led
the court to believe that the legislature never intended for a protective
order to be issued absent a new incident of domestic violence.66
Sarah and the amici also pointed to committee hearings, during
which legislators seemed to indicate a presumption that the statute
allowed for renewals.67 Nonetheless, the court refused to “rewrite the law
to conform to a mistaken view of the law that the legislature had when it
amended the statute.”68 Highlighting the legislature’s role in setting
policy, the court determined that the absence of a renewal provision was
a policy choice, concluding that “[i]t is not the court’s role or prerogative
to modify the legislature’s policy decision.”69
The court’s decision meant that Sarah would go without a protective
order until either the legislature amended the law or she suffered another
incident of domestic violence. While legislative action was hardly out of
61. Id. at 155.
62. Id.
63. See id. (“[T]he language of the statute unambiguously provides for the
duration of the various kinds of protective relief that can be ordered.”).
64. See id. at 155–56 (“Those specific time limits were expanded by the 2004
legislation. If the legislature intended to allow for multiple protective orders from
the same incident of domestic violence, it did not say so in the statute.”).
65. Id. at 155.
66. See id. at 157 (“Here the legislature enacted an unambiguous statute with
a clear time limit—originally six months then later one year—and it did so while
replacing a statute that permitted an extension. It is not the court’s role or
prerogative to modify the legislature’s policy decision.”).
67. Id. at 156; see also infra Part V.
68. Whalen, 425 P.3d at 155.
69. Id. at 157.
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the question, the difficult decision trapped Sarah in an impossible
situation, sparking two of the five members of the court to join in a
dissenting opinion.70
Joined by Justice Winfree, Justice Maassen argued in his dissenting
opinion that neither the statute nor res judicata should have tied the
court’s hands.71 Res judicata, wrote Justice Maassen, applies in a civil suit,
where a party is injured, receives compensation for the injury, and is thus
barred from bringing the same claim against the same defendant.72 By
applying the doctrine, the majority had denied the second step in the
petition process: the judge’s discretion to grant the order.73 Once the court
finds that the respondent committed an act of domestic violence against
the petitioner, the claim has not run its course, as it would have in a civil
case.74 The second step to granting a protective order, Justice Maassen
pointed out, involves the judge exercising his discretion to determine
whether the order should be granted.75 This discretion is rooted in the
statute’s fundamental purpose, which is to protect the petitioner;
punishing the respondent is a means to an end, not the end itself.76 And
unlike a civil case, in which the claim is complete when the judgment is
issued and damages are awarded, the question of whether protection is
still necessary beyond the first year is not answered in the original
protective order.77 All the original order determined was that the
petitioner needed protection at that moment, not a year into the future.78
Therefore, “[b]ecause that claim was not and could not have been litigated
in 2017, the doctrine of res judicata, by definition, cannot apply.”79
Additionally, the dissenting justices disagreed with the majority’s
reading of section 18.66.100. They first noted that, while the legislature
had not explicitly allowed multiple protective orders to derive from the
same incident of domestic violence, neither had it explicitly denied that
numerous protective orders could be granted based on a single incident.80
70. Id. at 158.
71. Id. (Maassen, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 159.
73. Id.
74. See id. (“[A] domestic violence petition is thus much different from, say, a
claim for the tort of assault, in which the plaintiff is awarded compensation for a
past wrong and then closes the books on it forever.”).
75. Id.
76. See id. (“It is a ‘protective order,’ intended not only to acknowledge a past
bad act on the part of the respondent but also, and primarily, to protect the
petitioner from future harm.”).
77. See id. (“A domestic violence petitioner is seeking ongoing protection, not
compensation for a past wrong.”).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 158.
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As for the one-year time limit on most provisions, the dissenting justices
viewed that as an indication of when a review of the provisions’ efficacy
should take place.81 Subsection (b)(2), which restricts the provisions to one
year, “simply assures that there will be a new judicial review . . .
requir[ing] a petitioner to return to court to justify the continuation of
such extraordinary restrictions if, after a year has passed, she still requires
protection.”82
Though the dissent is persuasive, reading into the statute a
mechanism for extending a protective order nonetheless would have
usurped the legislature’s role as the lawmaking body. Between
potentially overstepping its role and limiting itself perhaps beyond what
was necessary, the court chose the latter, sending a message to the
legislature that the courts would not rewrite laws that were poorly
written to begin with.
Domestic violence is terrible. That is not up for debate. The
emotional nature of the problem would have compelled judicial action
perhaps more than any other case decided in the 2018 term. Yet the court
chose restraint. This choice was a testament to the principles
underpinning the separation of powers. Sarah Whalen deserved a better
outcome, but the court’s role was not to rewrite the law to ensure such an
outcome. A decision in the alternative may have done just that, and while
that outcome in the instant case would have been more suitable, the
foundations which separate the branches of government would have been
weakened. To understand the legislative folly leading to the Whalen
decision, it is important to investigate the legislative history of the
protective order statutory scheme.

IV. PRIOR VERSIONS OF THE STATUTE
Alaska’s modern protective order statutory scheme is rooted in its
predecessor, section 25.35.010 of the Alaska Statutes.83 This previous
iteration was quite different, though many of the injunctive and monetary
relief provisions carried over to the present version.84 The most glaring
differences were in the duration of the order and, critically, the ability to
renew the order at the petitioner’s request.85 The original orders lasted at
most ninety days—a far cry from today’s year-long timeframe, or the
indefinite section 18.66.100(c)(1) provision.86 With that said, section
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.010 (repealed 1996).
Compare id., with ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100 (2019).
Id. § 25.35.010.
Id. § 25.35.010(c).

37.1 BUCHMAN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2020

7/6/2020 11:20 AM

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROTECTIVE ORDER

67

25.35.010 did contain a renewal procedure, granting the court the
authority to extend the injunctive relief provisions another forty-five days
if necessary.87
In 1996, the Alaska legislature passed the Domestic Violence
Prevention and Victim Protection Act (“1996 Act”),88 overhauling the
protective order statutory scheme.89 Why the extension provision was
eliminated from the 1996 Act is not immediately clear, though striking a
reasonable balance between the petitioner’s protection and the
respondent’s rights seemed to play an important role. Throughout the
various committee hearings on the 1996 bill, increasing the length of time
of orders and removing the extension provision were scarcely covered
topics. However, one key portion of the minutes does seem to encapsulate
a critical viewpoint regarding the balancing of rights and protection. CoChairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Rick Halford, while
discussing the property rights of respondents, noted his concern for the
potential violation of individuals’ constitutional rights, though he
thought such violations were acceptable so long as the orders were
absolutely necessary and limited in duration.90
Without placing too much weight on Halford’s ability to influence
the legislation, it is critical to note that Halford, a Republican, was the
Senate Majority leader during 1996, and he had served as the President of
the Senate from 1994 to 1995.91 It stands to reason that his concern over
the “trampling of constitutional rights” was not an isolated viewpoint,
and the fact that he voiced his opinion on the issue indicates that
legislation which tipped the balance too far against the respondent may
not have even made it to a vote, at least not under his leadership. While
the minutes do not offer definitive answers as to why the extension
provision was eliminated, Senator Halford’s concerns should not be
dismissed as the ruminations of a lone senator, but perhaps viewed
instead as the opinion of a large contingent of the legislative body.

V. RELEVANT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The only significant amendment to section 18.66.100 of the Alaska
Statutes prior to Whalen occurred in 2004, when the legislature doubled
87. Id. § 25.35.010(c).
88. Domestic Violence Prevention and Victim Protection Act, 1996 Alaska
Sess. Laws ch. 64.
89. See id.
90. Hearing on H.B. 314, S. FIN. COMM., MINUTES, 19th Leg. (May 5, 1996)
(comments of Sen. Rick Halford).
91. 22nd Alaska State Legislature Senator Rick Halford (R) President of the Senate,
ALASKA REPUBLICANS, http://www.akrepublicans.org/pastlegs/22ndleg/biohalford.shtml (last visited April 19, 2020).
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the time limit of most of the protective order provisions from six months
to twelve months.92 The 2004 amendment was introduced by Senator
Hollis French in Senate Bill 308 (“SB 308”).93 In the first committee hearing
for SB 308, Senator French summarized the comparable statutes in other
states, noting:
[J]ust five states have long-term domestic violence protective
orders that have a shorter time period than Alaska. Three have
the same six-month maximum period and the 40 other states
have increased the length of time to a year and beyond. In this
bill we would set the time frame at one year. It’s an incremental
step and I think it’s a reasonable balance between an order that
never ends and an order that is too short of a duration.94
It is telling that Senator French introduced SB 308 with this
statement. First, it demonstrates that the primary factor motivating the
bill was that the length of Alaska’s protective order provisions lagged
behind those of most other states. Additionally, it shows that the
legislature attempted to strike a “reasonable balance” between the
petitioner’s security and the rights of the respondent. Longer or even
permanent orders could have deprived the respondent of certain rights
and liberties; similarly, the ability to renew an order without new
incidents of domestic violence was perhaps deemed inimical to striking a
balance between the interests of the petitioner and the rights of the
respondent.
It is also likely that the senators did not realize that a petitioner could
not renew the protective order given that they discussed the prospect of
renewals on numerous occasions. At one point, Senator Gretchen Guess
stated that if, at the end of a six month restraining order, continued
protection was warranted, then a petitioner could simply seek another
order.95 Senator French agreed, noting that someone whose relationship
issues continued up to the six month mark could simply have the order
extended.96 At a later hearing, Senator French framed the lengthening
from six months to one year as a cost-saving measure given the frequency
at which courts must renew orders, and he highlighted specific examples
92. Act of June 29, 2004, § 23, 2004 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 124, 12.
93. See Hearing on S.B. 308, ALASKA S. STATE AFFAIRS COMM. MINUTES, 23d Leg.
(Mar. 11, 2004) (comments of Sen. Hollis French) (extending the order to one year
assures “longer protection to petitioners who are seeking protection from an
abuser”). The substance of this amendment was ultimately passed in SB 170. Act
of June 29, 2004, § 23, 2004 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 124, 12.
94. Hearing on S.B. 308, ALASKA S. STATE AFFAIRS COMM. MINUTES, 23d Leg.
(Mar. 11, 2004) (comments of Sen. Hollis French).
95. Id. at 16 (comments of Sen. Gretchen Guess).
96. Id. (comments of Sen. Hollis French).

37.1 BUCHMAN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2020

7/6/2020 11:20 AM

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROTECTIVE ORDER

69

of petitioners who sought numerous orders because of continuing issues
with respondents.97
The court in Whalen argued that these exchanges demonstrated the
senators’ awareness of the lack of a renewal provision, because their use
of “refile” and “extended” was in the context of “lingering issues,”
implying that these new protective orders were supported by new
incidents of domestic violence.98
More likely, though, the senators did not realize that the statute’s
wording would, fifteen years later, be interpreted to require a new
incident of domestic violence. As the dissent in Whalen pointed out, the
legislature “did not say it intended to prohibit ‘multiple protective orders
from the same incident of domestic violence,’ which it could easily have
done had it intended that result.”99 In all likelihood, the dissent’s analysis
of the legislative history is correct. To read into the legislative history an
explicit requirement of a new incident of domestic violence seems a
bridge too far based on the scant deliberations.
There is also a significant likelihood that the legislature may have
been dissuaded from adopting a new extension mechanism because of the
desire to strike a “reasonable balance” between the petitioner’s safety and
the respondent’s rights. The focus on such a balance shows that the
legislature may not have intended to allow renewals in the absence of a
new incident of domestic violence. At one hearing, a member of the
public, James Dieringer III, contended that he was “that 10 to 15 percent
of the men who have been abused by this system” and that five protective
orders were issued against him “as a tool to gain custody, child support,
possession of the home, those kinds of things.”100
Notably Dieringer’s testimony foreshadowed the very issue raised
in Whalen. He requested that the senators revisit the probable cause
standard, condemning the court’s apparent ability to find probable cause
to issue new orders based solely on the acts which justified the original
order.101 Barbara Brink, the Director of the Alaska Public Defender
Agency, expressed similar concerns.102 She added that the amendment
paternalistically required the court to issue one-year orders, and that she
97. Hearing on S.B. 308, ALASKA S. JUDICIARY COMM. MINUTES, 23d Leg. (Mar.
26, 2004) (comments of Sen. Hollis French).
98. See Whalen v. Whalen, 425 P.3d 150, 156 (Alaska 2018) (“This
understanding is consistent with allowing additional orders only when the prior
order has been violated or when a new incident of domestic violence has
occurred.”).
99. Id. at 158.
100. Hearing on S.B. 308, ALASKA S. JUDICIARY COM. MINUTES, 23d Leg. (Mar. 26,
2004) (comments of James Dierenger III).
101. Id. at 26.
102. Id. at 27 (comments of Barbara Brink).
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was far more amenable to giving the judge the discretion to grant an order
of six months and up to one year.103
These concerns were not lost on the Committee. Responding to
Dieringer’s complaints regarding the court’s ability to reuse past acts of
domestic violence to justify multiple orders, Senator Scott Ogan remarked
that it could be a good idea to revisit, and potentially increase, the
probable cause requirement applicable to the protective orders.104 Senator
Ralph Seekins, Chairman of the Committee, reflected that he was aware
of attorneys who abused the protective order system to gain leverage
during divorce proceedings.105 Later, Senator Ogan proposed
Amendment 2, which would have required petition forms to “contain a
conspicuous warning that the petitions and requests are submitted under
oath under penalty of perjury and that a person making a false statement
may be prosecuted for perjury and, if found guilty, may be punished for
violation of a felony.”106 The Senate Judiciary Committee did in fact adopt
the amendment.107 Though it was not ultimately included in the final
version of the bill,108 its adoption speaks to the importance placed on the
respondent’s liberty. Clearly, a desire to ensure some level of protection
for the respondent influenced these proceedings.
Interestingly, the Whalen court refrained from highlighting these
policy concerns. A likely explanation can be found in Dierenger’s
statement, in which he confessed, “I’m kind of embarrassed to be here
today. I’m very nervous to be here.”109 Simply put, many people still
believe that discussing domestic violence is taboo.110 Considering the
harshness of the court’s ruling, a discussion of an abuser’s rights and
liberties likely was not deemed the most tactful or persuasive approach.
The 2004 amendment to section 18.66.100 of the Alaska Statutes
could be characterized as concise, narrow, and perfunctory. While the
legislature demonstrated some awareness of Alaska’s domestic protective
order statute in relation to other states, legislators failed to engage with
the language of the statute beyond the basic discussions regarding an

103. Id.
104. Id. at 26 (comments of Sen. Scott Ogan).
105. Id. (comments of Sen. Ralph Seekins).
106. Hearing on S.B. 308, ALASKA S. JUDICIARY COM. MINUTES, 23d Leg. (Apr. 7,
2004) (comments of Sen. Scott Ogan).
107. SB 308, 23rd Leg., 2d Sess. (2004).
108. See Act of June 29, 2004, § 23, 2004 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 124, 12 (not
including the amendment in the final text).
109. Hearing on S.B. 308, ALASKA S. JUDICIARY COM. MINUTES, 23d Leg. (Mar. 26,
2004) (comments of James Dierenger III).
110. ALLSTATE FOUNDATION, 2018 NATIONAL POLL ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND
FINANCIAL ABUSE 26 (2018) (finding that 1 in 3 people think discussing domestic
violence is taboo, up ten percent since 2014).
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order’s length. Perhaps the desire to strike a reasonable balance between
the parties’ interests and rights dissuaded legislators from taking a more
aggressive approach to the amendment, and interestingly enough, this
policy concern did dominate much of the deliberations. Yet, despite
touching on the issue of an extension mechanism, the legislature chose to
limit its focus to the length of the original order. It is clear that the
amendment failed to address the issue that would later surface in Whalen.

VI. POST-WHALEN AMENDMENT
In 2019, the Alaska legislature once again amended section 18.66.100
of the Alaska Statutes.111 State Representative Chuck Kopp, the prime
sponsor for House Bill 12 (“HB 12”), remarked that this amendment was
a direct response—a fix—to the Whalen decision.112 Representative Kopp
set forth the bill’s core purpose, which was to allow “victims that already
have a long term protective order to request an extension of that order
within thirty days of it expiring or up to sixty days after it has expired.”113
Further, Representative Kopp noted that HB 12 sought to specifically
address the Whalen decision, allowing court’s to grant extensions based
on the petitioner’s continuing fear rather than a new incident of domestic
violence.114
Compared to the 2004 amendment, which sought to address
imprecise and complicated policy goals—preventing domestic violence
and aligning Alaska’s domestic violence protective order statutory
scheme with a perceived standard gleaned from statutes across the
nation—the 2019 amendment was a more intentional, targeted response
to a readily identifiable problem. Thus, rather than legislators and
witnesses struggling to unravel the conundrum of domestic violence, the
witnesses were able to address the specific issue of the lack of an extension
mechanism in section 18.66.100. As a result, deliberations were more
illuminating, and the concept of striking a “reasonable balance” was not
nearly the detractor that it proved to be during the 2004 amendment
process.
The legislature heard public testimony from leaders in the field of
domestic violence prevention in Alaska. Their insight shed light on the
practical reverberations of the Whalen decision. Teryn Bird, an attorney
representing victims of domestic violence, emphasized that at least one
court, the Fourth Judicial District in Fairbanks, re-issued orders without
111. An Act Relating to Protective Orders, 2019 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 7.
112. Hearing on H.B. 12, H. STATE AFFAIRS COMM. AUDIO TAPES, 31st Leg. (Feb.
28, 2019) (comments of Rep. Chuck Kopp at 3:10:32 PM).
113. Id. (comments of Rep. Chuck Kopp at 3:13:53 PM).
114. Id.
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requiring a finding of a new act of domestic violence.115 The Whalen
decision abruptly ended this practice.116 Bird revealed that “countless
clients” have been affected by the Whalen decision.117 She recounted the
story of one family who, after the expiration of a year-long protective
order, continued to suffer a perpetrator’s constant intimidation.118 His
acts did not rise to a crime or threat of domestic violence, but because of
the expiration of the year-long protective order, the family would have to
be “re-victimized if they ever want to be provided the same opportunity
to heal and feel protected.”119
Christine Pate of the Alaska Network on Domestic Violence and
Sexual Assault (ANDVSA) reiterated that there was considerable
confusion among lower courts regarding the prospect of issuing
extensions.120 Like Bird, Pate testified that judges in various regions of
Alaska interpreted their level of discretion differently, so that some courts
frequently granted new orders without requiring new incidents of
domestic violence while others did not.121 Pate additionally illustrated
how the Whalen decision confounded an already horrific situation for
victims. With only one, year-long order to protect them, victims were
“forced to make impossible strategic decisions as to when to apply for a
protection order so as to maximize their safety.”122 The House Judiciary
Committee subsequently held a hearing for HB 12, and public testimony
again attracted numerous leaders in the domestic violence prevention
field, all of whom highlighted the struggles endured by victims following
the Whalen decision.123
Unlike in 2004, the legislators did not dwell on the rights of the
respondent. Perhaps this was due to a change in times. More likely,
however, is that the Whalen trigger cabined the deliberations. The notion
that another order would require a new incident of domestic violence is
shocking, and rectifying that outcome would hardly support a review of
how the fix would impact respondents. In fact, such a discussion would
be tasteless. On the other hand, the 2004 deliberations involved a
115. Hearing on H.B. 12, H. STATE AFFAIRS STANDING COMM. AUDIO TAPES, 31st
Leg. (Mar. 7, 2019) (comments of Teryn Bird at 4:10:14 PM).
116. See id. (“That remedy has been removed, leaving victims of egregious and
lethal crimes without protection unless re-victimized in a way that is recognized
as a crime by the State of Alaska.”).
117. Id.
118. Id at 4:11:02 PM.
119. Id. at 4:12:10 PM.
120. Id. (comments of Christine Pate at 4:13:33 PM).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 4:15:54 PM
123. See Hearing on H.B. 12, H. JUDICIARY STANDING COMM. AUDIO TAPES, 31st
Leg. (Mar. 18, 2019) (public testimony at 1:56:30 PM) (testimony reiterating the
multitude of problems created by the Whalen decision).
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doubling of the order’s fairly invasive restraints, and unlike in 2019, the
deliberations were not prompted by any event in particular, especially
not an event like the Whalen decision.
Yet, the respondent’s rights were nonetheless still present during
these hearings. During public testimony, two members of the public did
bemoan the burdens faced by respondents;124 however, it does not appear
that legislators grappled vocally with these brief comments, at least not
during the hearing, and especially not to the degree that they had
discussed Dierenger’s 2004 testimony.125
At two other moments during hearings, legislators did discuss the
interests of the respondent. The first instance occurred during the March
7 hearing, when Representative Sarah Vance wondered what protections
were in place for those who felt they were wrongly accused of domestic
violence.126 Maggie Humm of the Alaska Legal Services Corporation
replied that respondents should receive notice of the proceedings, have a
right to be heard during the proceedings, and be able to appeal the
issuance of a protective order.127
Later, in a March 18 Judiciary Committee hearing, the discussion
shifted to the duration of sexual assault and stalking protective orders.128
After Representative Gabrielle LeDoux queried whether Representative
Kopp believed it was wise to increase sexual assault and stalking
protective orders from six months to one year, Representative Kopp
replied that he was conflicted because he wanted to balance “protect[ing]
people as long as possible” with avoiding violations of individuals’
liberty.129 Representative Kopp’s comments echoed the sentiment that
persisted throughout the 2004 amendment process, though that sentiment
hardly affected these deliberations. Unlike in 2004, the drafters of this
amendment set out to solve a specific problem, a problem that was
deemed anathema to the statute’s core purpose, and perhaps a broader
discussion of the respondent’s liberty would have been inappropriate
given these circumstances. Ultimately, HB 12 was enacted in June 2019.130

124. See id. (testimony of Robin Mitchell and Adam Fletcher at 2:06:10 PM)
(describing struggles faced by respondents of domestic violence protective
orders).
125. See id.; supra Part V.
126. Hearing on H.B. 12, H. STATE AFFAIRS STANDING COMM. AUDIO TAPES, 31st
Leg. (Mar. 7, 2019) (comments of Representative Sarah Vance at 4:20:05 PM).
127. Id. (comments of Maggie Humm at 4:22:05 PM).
128. Hearing on H.B. 12, H. JUDICIARY STANDING COMM. AUDIO TAPES, 31st Leg.
(Mar. 18, 2019) (introduced by Rep. Chuck Kopp at 1:33:16 PM).
129. Id. at 2:21:33 PM.
130. An Act Relating to Protective Orders, 2019 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 7.
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VI. CURRENT STATUTE AND JUDICIAL TREATMENT
The following reflect the changes to section 18.66.100(e) of the Alaska
Statutes:
(e) A court may not deny a petition for a protective order under
this section solely because
(1) there is of a lapse of time between an act of domestic
violence and the filing of the petition;
(2) the act of domestic violence was the basis for a previous
protective order; or
(3) a court previously found that the incident was a crime
of domestic violence committed against the petitioner but
declined to order relief under this section, if the petition
alleges a change in circumstances since the court’s previous
finding.131
Furthermore, the legislature added a new subsection to provide for
a renewal mechanism:
(f) Within 30 days before, or within 60 days after, the expiration
of a protective order issued or extended under (b)(2) of this
section, a petitioner may petition the court for an extension of
the protective order. The court shall schedule a hearing and
provide at least 10 days’ notice to the respondent of the hearing
and of the respondent’s right to appear and be heard, either in
person or through an attorney. If the court finds that an
extension of the provisions of the order is necessary to protect
the petitioner from domestic violence, regardless of whether the
respondent appears at the hearing, the court may extend the
provisions of the order. An extension granted under this
subsection is effective for one year unless earlier dissolved by
court order. If the court grants an extension before the protective
order expires, the extension takes effect on the day the protective
order would have expired.132
The legislature solved the Whalen issue using a two-pronged
approach. First, the legislature, in subsection (e)(3), explicitly rejected the
notion that a new order could not be granted even if it was based on the
same act of domestic violence—in other words, the exact issue posed in

131. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(e) (2018); An Act Relating to Protective Orders,
§ 4, 2019 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 7, 2. Additions are in bold italics, and deletions are
indicated with strikethroughs.
132. An Act Relating to Protective Orders, § 5, 2019 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 7, 2–
3.
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Whalen.133 Second, the legislature included subsection (f), which provides
for an extension mechanism.134 While not explicitly at issue in Whalen, this
extension provision would have resolved Sarah Whalen’s dilemma
because such an extension would not require proof of additional acts
other than those that served as the basis for the original order.
Shortly after the amendment, the Alaska Supreme Court ruled in
Mitchell v. Mitchell135 that the legislature had adequately solved the issue
that the court had highlighted in Whalen.136 Yet, despite this limited fix, a
survey of other states demonstrates that Alaska can nonetheless improve
on section 18.66.100, tackling issues well beyond the addition of the
renewal mechanism, a mechanism that should have been included in the
statute to begin with.

VII. PROTECTIVE ORDER STATUTES IN OTHER STATES
Should the Alaska legislature see fit to further exercise its
“prerogative to make any policy changes to the statute,”137 protective
order statutes in other states offer a roadmap for change. This Section
distills the wide variety of statutes into a few categories. It begins by
inspecting the discretionary model. Then, the Section moves on to discuss
forms of extensions. Then the Section assesses the less common hybrid
and permanent approaches. Lastly, this Section culminates with an
overview of how firearms are treated in these statutes.
A. Discretionary Model
Some statutes, such as North Dakota’s, give the court the discretion
to grant a protective order for however long it deems necessary to protect
the petitioner.138 North Dakota’s statute does not contain time limitations
for its remedial provisions. Instead, the North Dakota Supreme Court has
interpreted the statute to give the court full discretion to set the length of
the order, even allowing for indefinite orders, so long as the length of the

133. § 18.66.100(e)(3); An Act Relating to Protective Orders, § 4, 2019 Alaska
Sess. Laws ch. 7, 2.
134. § 18.66.100(f); An Act Relating to Protective Orders, § 5, 2019 Alaska Sess.
Laws ch. 7, 2–3.
135. 445 P.3d 660 (Alaska 2019).
136. See id. at 664 (Alaska 2019) (acknowledging that the legislature, by
amending the law on protective orders, had clarified the issue addressed in
Whalen and granted courts the authority to issue additional long term protective
orders relying on the same conduct that served as a basis for the original order).
137. Whalen v. Whalen, 425 P.3d 150, 156 (Alaska 2018).
138. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02 (2019).
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order is “reasonable under the facts of each particular case.”139
Additionally, North Dakota’s statute permits the court to grant an order
“upon a showing of actual or imminent domestic violence.”140 This
standard enables the court to grant an order based solely on the
petitioner’s fear, rather than, as a threshold matter, requiring a past act;
however, the court does hold petitioners to an exacting standard, which,
in practice, likely requires evidence of past abuse.141
Hawaii’s statute is similar to North Dakota’s, except that, instead of
leaving the issue of discretion to the judiciary, the legislature explicitly
provided courts with the discretion to grant an order for a “fixed
reasonable period as the court deems appropriate.”142
Vermont’s statute is perhaps the most interesting of the three
discretionary models assessed in this Note.143 The injunctive relief
available is not limited in the statute, except that the length of the order
must “be granted for a fixed period.”144 However, the court does not have
discretion as to whether to grant the order; instead, the legislature
mandates that the court grant an order if it “finds that the defendant has
abused the plaintiff,” and if “there is a danger of further abuse.”145 In fact,
the Vermont Supreme Court has taken this mandate to nullify any res
judicata arguments.146
These discretionary models do have drawbacks, largely in that they
offer unpredictable protection. Giving the court broad discretion to set the
length of the protective order could lead to unfairly detrimental outcomes
for both the petitioner and the respondent. For the abused, a lack of
uniformity could mean a lack of protection. As an empirical matter,
academics have found that courts “trivialize[] domestic violence cases,”147
and that the “history of domestic violence is not properly considered in
cases of child custody, child support, and visitation.”148 In the child
139. Rinas v. Engelhardt, 818 N.W.2d 767, 771 (N.D. 2012).
140. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02(4) (2019).
141. See Niska v. Falconer, 824 N.W.2d 778, 782 (N.D. 2012) (“[P]ast abusive
behavior and the context and history of the parties’ relationship are relevant
factors in determining whether domestic violence is actual or imminent.”).
142. HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-5.5(a) (2019).
143. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1103 (2019).
144. Id. § 1103(d).
145. Id. § 1103(c)(1)–(c)(1)(A).
146. See Woodward v. Woodward, No. 12-113, 2012 Vt. Unpub. LEXIS 125, at
*6 (Vt. Sept. 26, 2012) (“[W]e reject defendant’s suggestion that mother was
precluded from raising instances of abuse cited in the earlier RFA proceeding and
could not obtain a new RFA order unless she proved new abuse by defendant
since the initial order issued.”).
147. Jeannette F. Swent, Gender Bias at the Heart of Justice: An Empirical Study of
State Task Forces, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 1, 56 (1996).
148. Id. at 57 tbl.1 (describing the results presented in a table that nine of the
fourteen states studied found domestic violence did not play a major role when
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support context, complete discretion tends to lead to inconsistent
outcomes and lower support awards.149 Victims of domestic violence
suffer from bias inside and outside the courtroom,150 so providing
guidelines to judges as they determine the length of orders could ensure
added protection.
Respondents to protective orders face significant bias as well.
Unfortunately, there exist few studies that shed any light on how the
respondents face bias; however, case-by-case, qualitative examples
demonstrate the phenomenon. In North Dakota, the supreme court had
to modify a protective order down from twenty years to five years.151
Some argue that Hawaii and Vermont, due to the considerable deference
given to the trial judges, suffer from a lack of clarity when it comes to
formulating the length of protective orders.152 Undoubtedly, the wide
discretion afforded to these judges, coupled with bias, could lead to
wildly unpredictable results.153
B. Fixed-Limit Extension Model
Some states fix the duration of orders but provide for an extension
mechanism. Alaska’s current statute is categorized as a fixed-limit
extension model.154 These mechanisms come in a variety of forms. Some
states apply an objective reasonableness standard to determine whether
considering child custody, child support, and visitation).
149. Jane K. Stoever, Enjoining Abuse: The Case for Indefinite Domestic Violence
Protection Orders, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1015, 1083–84 (2014).
150. See generally Wendy L. Patrick, Ph.D., How Social Stigma Silences Domestic
Violence
Victims,
PSYCHOL.
TODAY
(Apr
9,
2018),
https://
www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/why-bad-looks-good/201804/
howsocial-stigma-silences-domestic-violence-victims (explaining why victims of
domestic violence often remain silent); ACLU, RESPONSES FROM THE FIELD: SEXUAL
ASSAULT, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AND POLICING (2015), https://www.aclu.org/
report/sexual-assault-domestic-violence-and-policing
(summarizing
recommendations and stories by practitioners who work with survivors of
domestic violence); Kristine Phillips, ‘Intolerable’: Judge Reprimanded After She
‘Berated and Belittled’ Domestic-Violence Victim, WASH. POST, (Sept. 1, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/09/01/
intolerable-judge-reprimanded-after-she-berated-and-belittled-domesticviolence-victim/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6bcc8286ef4b (reprimanding a
judge under the state’s code of judicial conduct after she “berated” and “belittled”
a woman, using “sarcastic” language throughout the hearing).
151. Rinas v. Engelhardt, 818 N.W.2d 767, 771–72 (N.D. 2012).
152. Dana Harrington Conner, Civil Protection Order Duration: Proof Procedural
Issues, and Policy Considerations, 24 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 343, 351–
52 (2015).
153. See id. at 349–52 (discussing how the lack of guidance and considerable
discretion enjoyed by judges in states that have adopted a discretionary model
can lead to unpredictable outcomes).
154. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(f) (2019).
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an order should be extended. California, for instance, limits initial orders
to a maximum of five years, but the statute allows the orders to be
renewed based on such a standard.155 The renewals can last an additional
five years, or they can be made permanent.156 The standard for renewals,
set forth in Ritchie v. Konrad,157 is quite lenient: the trial court “should
grant a requested extension unless the request is contested and the judge
determines the protected party does not entertain a ‘reasonable
apprehension’ of future abusive conduct.”158 The court in Ritchie
emphasized that “it is unnecessary, however, to find [whether] any abuse
has occurred since issuance of the initial protective order.”159 Ohio
adopted a similar standard, requiring a trial court to find “that petitioner
has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that petitioner or
petitioner’s family or household members are in danger of domestic
violence.”160 Utah has adopted a similar approach.161 The statute
mandates that a judge must find a “substantial likelihood of abuse or
domestic violence.”162 In Bailey v. Bayles,163 the Utah Court of Appeals
established that, in petitions for permanent protective orders, the
substantial likelihood test equated to whether there was “a present fear
of future abuse,” emphasizing that the “present fear” must be
“reasonable.”164 Minnesota codified a reasonableness standard in its test
for prohibiting the respondent from possessing firearms.165
Some states require evidence that the order was violated in order to
extend it. Delaware requires that the order can only be extended when the
court finds, by a preponderance standard, that “domestic violence has
occurred since the entry of the order,” or “a violation of the order has
occurred.”166 Texas once required a violation of the initial order for a new
order to be granted;167 however, the legislature instituted a new standard,
allowing a petitioner to file with just a description of “the threatened
harm that reasonably places the applicant in fear of imminent physical
harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault.”168
155. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6345 (Deering 2020).
156. Id.
157. Ritchie v. Konrad, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 387 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
158. Id. at 388.
159. Id.
160. Felton v. Felton, 679 N.E.2d 672, 678 (Ohio 1997).
161. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-103 (LexisNexis 2020).
162. Id.
163. 18 P.3d 1129 (Utah App. 2001).
164. Id. at 1131–33.
165. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(6a) (2018).
166. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045 (West 2018).
167. Bree Buchanan & Cindy Dyer, 76th Legislative Session Domestic Violence
Law Update, 62 TEX. B.J. 922, 923 (1999).
168. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 82.008 (West 2018).
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While most petitioners bear the burden of proof in order to extend
or renew a protective order,169 in Washington, the burden is on the
respondent.170 Washington mandates the court to grant a renewal “unless
the respondent proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the
respondent will not resume acts of domestic violence against the
petitioner or the petitioner’s children or family or household members
when the order expires.”171
Generally, most states that mandate a one-year initial order also
permit year-long extensions.172 With that said, some states take a different
approach to the length of the extension, basing the length of an extension
on whether the initial order is violated. In Tennessee, the initial order is
limited to one year.173 The respondent’s first violation may be
accompanied by an extension of up to five years, and upon a second
violation, the court may extend the order by up to ten years.174 Similarly,
initial protective orders in Maryland are capped at one year, but violating
the order allows the court to grant a final protective order of two years.175
West Virginia’s initial order is limited to only ninety days, but if it is
violated, the judge can extend the order indefinitely “for whatever period
the court considers necessary to protect the physical safety of the
petitioner.”176 On the extreme side, in Minnesota, when the respondent
has violated an order more than twice, or if the petitioner has had more
than two protective orders issued against the respondent, the statute
allows a fifty-year order prohibiting contact and domestic violence.177
Some states permit a permanent extension beyond the initial order.
California allows for orders to be renewed permanently.178 Georgia also
provides for a permanent extension.179
C. Hybrid Approach
Another model is the hybrid approach. Alaska additionally utilizes
this approach—most provisions last one year, but subsection (c)(1),
prohibiting acts or threats of domestic violence, can persist indefinitely.180

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Stoever, supra note 149, at 1050.
See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.060(3) (West 2018).
Id.
Stoever, supra note 149, at 1051.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-605(b) (West 2018).
Id.
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-506(j) (West 2018).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-505(c) (West 2018).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(6a)(c) (West 2018).
CAL. FAM. CODE § 6345(a) (West 2018).
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4(c) (West 2018).
ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(b) (2020).
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Under this model, some provisions last longer than others. In Delaware,
for instance, most provisions last one year, but subsection (a)(1) and (a)(2),
which prohibit the respondent from committing future acts of domestic
violence and from contacting the petitioner, can last up to two years.181
Louisiana limits most provisions to eighteen months; however, the court
can indefinitely prohibit the respondent from “abusing, harassing, or
interfering with the person or employment or going near the residence or
place of employment of the petitioner.”182
D. Permanent Orders
Some states allow for permanent orders. In Alabama, final protection
orders are “of permanent duration unless otherwise specified or modified
by a subsequent order.”183 In Montana, based on the “respondent’s
history of violence, the severity of the offense at issue, and the evidence
presented at the hearing,” the court can grant a permanent order, which
may contain any of the provisions allowed in a temporary order.184 New
Jersey allows for permanent orders, termed “final restraining orders.”185
Under the New Jersey law, the court must find, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the respondent committed one of the predicate acts
required by the statute.186 Second, the court exercises its discretion as to
whether a final restraining order should be granted.187 This decision is
guided by a series of factors codified in the restraining order statute.188
These factors are not comprehensive, but they offer New Jersey courts
with a road map for instituting orders that have severe consequences. The
factors are:
(1) The previous history of domestic violence between the
plaintiff and defendant, including threats, harassment and
physical abuse;
(2) The existence of immediate danger to person or property;
(3) The financial circumstances of the plaintiff and defendant;
(4) The best interests of the victim and any child;
(5) In determining custody and parenting time the protection of
181. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045(a)–(b) (West 2018).
182. LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:2135(A)(1) (2020) ((referencing the full description of
prohibited behavior from § 46:2135(A)(1)).
183. ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(d)(2) (2018).
184. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-204 (West 2018).
185. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West 2018); A.M.C. v. P.B., 447 N.J. Super. 402,
414 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016).
186. Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19a (West 2018).
187. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 126–27.
188. Id. at 456.
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the victim’s safety; and
(6) The existence of a verifiable order of protection from another
jurisdiction.189
New Jersey’s guided approach is an interesting solution to a process
that can be susceptible to bias, but some commentators have highlighted
serious flaws in the law, including an unnecessarily restrictive definition
of abuse,190 as well as a failure to address incidents of non-intimate
partner violence.191
F. Firearms
Limitations on the respondent’s ability to purchase and possess
firearms are among the most effective provisions, but they are also
perhaps the most contentious due to their tendency to limit the exercise
of the Second Amendment. Crimes of domestic violence represent unique
challenges when it comes to prevention. The abuse often gets worse with
time,192 and similarly, the likelihood that the abuser uses a weapon
increases with time.193 Additionally, according to the Giffords Law
Center, women are five times more likely to be killed when the abuser
owns a firearm, and acts of domestic violence are twelve times more likely
to end in death when they involve a firearm.194
Furthermore, policy choices regarding gun regulations may impact
intimate partner homicide. One recent study of all states showed that
those with the highest firearm ownership experienced a 64.6% higher
domestic homicide rate compared to states with lower firearm ownership
rates.195
With that said, it is not entirely clear if protective orders aid in

189. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(a) (West 2018).
190. Conner, supra note 152, at 355.
191. Nick Tamburri, Note, A Lack of Civility: How New Jersey Fails to Protect
Women, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 1041, 1074 (2013).
192. Stoever, supra note 149, at 1023 (citing Jessica R. Goodkind et al., A
Contextual Analysis of Battered Women’s Safety Planning, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 514, 515 (2004) (“Once battering begins, it often escalates in frequency and
severity over time.”)).
193. Stoever, supra note 149, at 1024 (citing Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E.
Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes
and Case Law, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 801, 1155 (1993)) (“[I]t is well documented that as
domestic violence escalates, batterers often begin using weapons against their
victims.”).
194. Domestic Violence & Firearms, GIFFORDS L. CTR. (last visited Dec. 20, 2018),
https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/who-can-have-agun/domestic-violence-firearms/#state.
195. Aaron J. Kivisto et al., Firearm Ownership and Domestic Versus Nondomestic
Homicide in the U.S., 57 AM. J. OF PREVENTATIVE MED. 311, 319 (2019).
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prevention, though studies certainly indicate that they do make a positive
difference. A 2009 Department of Justice report stated that “[t]he research
has not been able to answer this question definitively, mainly because it
is not ethically permissible to randomly grant or deny protective orders
to compare results.”196 However, a more recent study from Michigan State
University found that states with domestic violence protective order
statutes that included firearm restrictions experienced a ten percent
reduction in domestic-violence-related homicides,197 which confirmed
similar results in prior studies.198
Currently, Alaska’s statute permits firearm restrictions only “if the
court finds that the respondent was in the actual possession of or used a
firearm during the commission of the domestic violence.”199 In addition
to Alaska, forty-two other states prohibit, in some form, the purchase or
ownership of weapons while an order is in effect.200 The most progressive
laws require police officers to confiscate firearms from the respondent
once a domestic violence restraining order is granted.201 Less effective
statutes require the respondent to surrender firearms when subject to a
protective order,202 and other states only require respondents to do so
196. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE RESEARCH: FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, PROSECUTORS AND JUDGES 58 (2009),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/225722.pdf.
197. April Zeoli et al., Analysis of the Strength of Legal Firearms Restrictions for
Perpetrators of Domestic Violence and Their Associations With Intimate Partner
Homicide,
187
AM.
J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY
2365,
2366
(2018),
https://academic.oup.com/aje/article-abstract/187/11/2365/
5154833?redirectedFrom=fulltext.
198. See Elizabeth Richardson Vigdor & James A. Mercy, Do Laws Restricting
Access to Firearms by Domestic Violence Offenders Prevent Intimate Partner Homicide?,
30 EVALUATION REV. 313, 332 (2006), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/
0193841X06287307 (finding an eight percent reduction in the domestic violence
rate and a nine percent reduction in the rate of domestic violence crimes
committed with a firearm); April M. Zeoli & Daniel W. Webster, Effects of Domestic
Violence Policies, Alcohol Taxes and Police Staffing Levels on Intimate Partner Homicide
in Large US Cities, 16 INJ. PREVENTION 90, 92 (2010), https://
injuryprevention.bmj.com/content/injuryprev/16/2/90.full.pdf (“[S]tate laws
restricting access to firearms for those under [protective orders], laws allowing
the police to arrest [protective order] violators, and higher police staffing levels
reduce the risk of intimate-partner homicides.”).
199. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(c)(6)–(7) (2019).
200. GIFFORDS L. CTR., supra note 194.
201. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b) (“A law enforcement officer shall
accompany the defendant, or may proceed without the defendant if necessary, to
any place where any firearm or other weapon belonging to the defendant is
located to ensure that the defendant does not gain access to any firearm or other
weapon, and a law enforcement officer shall take custody of any firearm or other
weapon belonging to the defendant.”); GIFFORDS L. CTR., supra note 194.
202. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:5(I) (stating that, upon finding that
domestic violence occurred, the court “shall direct the defendant to relinquish to
the peace officer any and all firearms and ammunition in the control, ownership,
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when certain conditions are met.203 Lastly, the weakest form of the statute
permits (rather than requires) courts to direct respondents to surrender
firearms.204 Alaska falls into this final category.205
The strength of the statute is important because many respondents
never relinquish their firearms, even when ordered by the court.206
Indeed, the process by which firearms are removed can play an important
role in the strength of the statute. Some statutes, like Alaska’s, fail to
provide any instructions as to how firearms should be removed,207
whereas others, like Pennsylvania, detail the process meticulously.208

VIII. CONCLUSION
The path forward for Alaska’s domestic violence protective order
statute has been paved by the trial and error of its fellow forty-nine states.
Additionally, the legislative history of section 18.66.100 should provide
some guidance as to a proper approach. The Alaska legislature has taken
the much-needed step forward to fix the Whalen outcome, but arguably
this fix should have been included in the original bill. And compared to
other states, the Alaska protective order statutory scheme lags behind.
The legislature must embrace its power to proactively tackle
domestic violence and intimate partner homicide. This seems
straightforward, but reviewing the deliberations demonstrates that, often,
legislators are willing to nudge the statute forward only when it seems
that Alaska is out of lockstep with the perceived standard set by other
states. This is problematic for three reasons. First, as shown in the
preceding Sections, finding a true standard is an impossible task, as these
statutes are quite varied. Second, domestic violence is an inherently
or possession of the defendant”); GIFFORDS L. CTR., supra note 194.
203. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842-a(2)(a) (“[The court shall] order the
immediate surrender [of firearms] where the court finds that the conduct which
resulted in the issuance of the order of protection involved (i) the infliction of
physical injury . . ., (ii) the use or threatened use of a deadly weapon or dangerous
instrument . . ., or (iii) behavior constituting any violent felony offense.”);
GIFFORDS L. CTR., supra note 194.
204. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-5-9(c)(4); ALASKA STAT. §18.66.100(c)(7)
(2020); GIFFORDS L. CTR., supra note 194.
205. § 18.66.100(c)(7) (2020).
206. See Daniel W. Webster et al., Women with Protective Orders Report Failure to
Remove Firearms from Their Abusive Partners: Results from an Exploratory Study, 19 J.
OF WOMEN’S HEALTH 93, 96 (2010), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC3120094/pdf/jwh.2007.0530.pdf (in a study of female victims of
domestic violence in New York and Los Angeles, only twelve percent reported
that their abuser had surrendered his firearms or had them seized).
207. GIFFORDS L. CTR., supra note 194.
208. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108(7) (West 2018)
(detailing meticulous process for firearm removal).
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complex issue, which requires a proactive approach; the legislature
cannot continue to wait until Alaska seems behind the pace of an already
unclear standard. Lastly, the issue of domestic violence is potentially
worse in Alaska than in any other state. One Anchorage-based activist
described the problem through this lens: “If Alaska was a Third World
country, with the rates of domestic violence and sexual assault that we
have, they’d declare a humanitarian crisis and the United Nations would
move in.”209 To truly make a dent in this issue, the legislature should
adopt a leadership—not lockstep—mentality. This is where the menu of
options available, based on other states’ approaches, should prove useful.
A. Length
A number of states empower judges with the discretion to tailor the
length of orders,210 whereas section 18.66.100 mandates a year-long order
(aside from the indefinite length applicable in subsection (c)(1)).211 The
discretion to issue a longer order could be useful for the worst cases;
petitioners would not be forced to confront their abusers in court, relive
the abuse, and repeatedly make their case year after year. And longer
orders would ensure a longer period of protection as well. Instead of
burdening a petitioner with the task of renewing the protective
provisions, the provisions would persist for a timeframe more consistent
with the potential harm.
Relatedly, the legislature could codify the possibility of a permanent
order.212 Some cases of domestic violence are so heinous and persistent
that a permanent order could be a proportionate solution, but without
that possibility, such cases are treated as any other. States offering the
option of a permanent order typically include a series of factors upon
which the court can base its decision,213 likely due to the severe
consequences of such orders. If it should choose to include an option for
a permanent order, the Alaska legislature should follow suit and identify
factors to help guide courts.

209. Lindsay Schnell, A Deadly place: Alaska is the Most Dangerous State for
Women, Now They’re Fighting Back, USA TODAY (June 25, 2019), https://
www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/nation/2019/06/25/deadly-place-metoohits-alaska-women-demand-tougher-laws/1503365001/.
210. See supra Section VII.A.
211. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(b)(2) (2019).
212. See supra Section VII.D.
213. See supra Section VII.D.
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B. Extension Mechanism
The legislative response to Whalen was subsection (f), which requires
the petitioner to convince the court that “an extension of the provisions of
the order is necessary to protect the petitioner from domestic violence.”214
While an adequate response to Whalen, the extension can be improved to
address more than just that defect.
First, Alaska could place the burden of persuasion on the
respondent, as seen in Washington.215 There, the respondent must prove
“by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent will not resume
acts of domestic violence.”216 Legally, such a burden ensures that the
respondent must undertake the legwork of collecting the evidence
necessary to prove why the respondent is no longer a threat. The work of
dispelling the presumption that the respondent is prone to future violence
should legally fall upon the respondent’s shoulders, not just because it
forces the respondent to take accountability for past acts and future
behavior, but most importantly because such evidence is likely in the
respondent’s possession and control, not the petitioner’s.
For fairness purposes, the perpetrator of domestic violence should at
least demonstrate why consequences, triggered by the respondent, need not
continue to restrain the respondent; victims should not be compelled to
satisfy a burden of proof to ensure their own protection. Lastly, the
petitioner’s requirement of showing the necessity of an extension is a high
bar to meet, especially when the respondent has not in fact demonstrated
further harmful behavior. There is little reason to avoid requiring the
respondent, who instigated the necessity of the original order, to at least
meet a similar burden.
Second, Alaska could tie mandatory extensions to the violation of a
protective order, similar to Tennessee.217 Not only would this promote
efficiency, but it could serve a preventative function. The knowledge that
a violation would lead to more severe consequences—a graduated
extension length corresponding to the number of violations—might
dissuade bad actors.
C. Firearms
The treatment of firearms in section 18.66.100 is the most pressing
aspect of future amendments. Considering the evidence tying gun

214.
215.
216.
217.

§ 18.66.100(f).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.060(3) (West 2018).
Id.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-605(b) (West 2018); see also supra Section VII.B.
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ownership to intimate partner homicide,218 common sense dictates that
those who are subject to domestic violence restraining orders should also
be subject to stricter firearm restrictions. Alaska authorizes courts to
direct respondents to surrender their firearms, and courts are granted that
authority only when the court finds that the respondent was in actual
possession of or used a firearm while committing the domestic
violence.219 This provision is problematic for three reasons.
First, courts are not required to direct respondents to surrender their
firearms, they are merely authorized to do so. The connection between
domestic violence, access to firearms, and intimate partner homicide is
too overwhelming to merely authorize a court to direct the
relinquishment of firearms.
Second, permitting the court to order the respondent’s
relinquishment only when certain conditions are met is an unnecessary
constraint. The issue is that domestic violence, however it may arise, can
lead to intimate partner homicide; thus, it is too constrictive at best, and
arbitrary at worst, to order firearm relinquishment only when the
violence is perpetrated with a firearm or when a firearm is actually
possessed.
Third, merely ordering the relinquishment of firearms is not
effective.220 The legislature should turn to Pennsylvania for a guide on
detailing the process by which firearms should be revoked, a process
which, ideally, should be carried out by law enforcement.221
******
While the legislature should be commended for its swift action
following Whalen, the 2019 amendment should open the door to further
action rather than a regression to complacence. The aforementioned
recommendations may instruct the legislature should it choose to amend
the law. The scourge of domestic violence is perhaps worse in Alaska than
in any other state, and it is time for the legislature to lead on the issue.
This Note outlines how the statutory scheme has developed to its current
condition, and it details a number of improvements that the legislature
can adopt. However, this Note covers only some of the legislative tools
available, and ideally the legislature can more comprehensively address
domestic violence than it has in the past. The time is ripe for action, and
with effective lawmaking, lives can be saved.

218. Supra Section VII.D.
219. § 18.66.100(c)(7).
220. Webster et al., supra note 206.
221. See 23 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108(7) (West 2018) (detailing a
meticulous process for firearm removal).

